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ARTICLES
WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS? ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION‘S NEGLECTED FRONTIER
NATASHA AFFOLDER†

I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale natural resource and infrastructure projects create some of
the most challenging and high-stakes contexts for environmental regulation. They are marked by a diversity of parties, including project
sponsors, contractors, commercial lenders, international financial institutions, numerous government agencies, and important non-contracting
parties including local communities, indigenous peoples, and environmental and human rights NGOs. Complexity is added by the multiplicity of jurisdictions from which these parties emerge. Networks of local
and foreign investors, domestic and international banks, and local and
international NGOs surround large projects with complex webs. And
the laws of multiple jurisdictions shape the project documents and avenues for dispute resolution. Large projects often impose a new legal
infrastructure on a country as well as a web of interlinked contracts,
many of which will be delocalized through international arbitration
clauses and references to foreign law, as well as ―international standards‖.
One might expect scholars of environmental law and regulation to
be circling these projects with anticipatory zeal, salivating at the opportunities for interdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and empirically rich re†
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search. As regulatory spaces, large projects provide a fascinating locus
for the study of multi-layered environmental regulation in situations of
considerable complexity. But to date, large projects have demonstrated
remarkable immunity from the insights of regulatory scholarship. Assessments of national approaches to environmental regulation of natural
resources remain the preferred lens.1 Project-specific studies, where
they exist, are often isolated within siloed areas of research focus,
whether geographic or subject-specific.2 Barriers between deep reservoirs of practitioner knowledge and areas of current scholarly interest
may also be to blame.
A workshop that celebrates John Braithwaite‘s contributions to regulatory scholarship, and particularly to responsive regulation, provides
an opportune moment to reflect on this lacuna in environmental regulatory research. Responsive regulation emerged as an attempt to transcend the confines of a stale, polarized theoretical debate over free
markets versus government regulation.3 Responsive regulatory theory
advances a dynamic, flexible, actor-oriented model of regulation that
envisages regulation as an ongoing process of moves and countermoves by regulators, fine-tuned to the individual actors involved and
their conduct. Responsive regulation can thus be situated within a wider
body of scholarship on ―decentred‖ approaches to regulation which are

1

See e.g. the excellent collections of largely country-specific case studies to emerge
out of the work of the Academic Advisory Group of the International Bar Association‘s Section on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and Infrastructure Law,
including: Barry Barton et al, eds, Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [Barton et al, Regulating]; Donald N Zillman,
Alastair R Lucas & George (Rock) Pring, eds, Human Rights in Natural Resource
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Donald L Zillman et al, eds,
Beyond the Carbon Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Aileen
McHarg et al, eds, Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).

2

For example, much current environmental research on large projects focuses on
environmental impact assessment processes. An opportunity exists to integrate this
work within larger multi-layered studies of project-specific environmental regulation.

3

The earliest full articulation of the theory of responsive regulation can be found in
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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attentive to the actions of the regulated.4 In Braithwaite‘s own words,
―[t]he basic idea of responsive regulation is that governments should be
responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding
whether a more or less interventionist response is needed.‖5 This is
graphically expressed through regulatory pyramids of sanction and support.6 At the base of the regulatory pyramid of sanctions lie dialogic
approaches to securing compliance; sanctions escalate as a regulator
moves up the pyramid.
This article provides reflections on one of the newer aspects of responsive regulatory theory most relevant to the large project context—
the networking of pyramidal actors. Braithwaite‘s restatement of the
theory of responsive regulation in this volume draws attention to the
capacity of regulators to ―escalate by networking in more regulatory
partners to put pressure on a regulated firm.‖7 The multiplicity of potential regulators, and the use of networked governance, resonates strongly
with the realities of large project regulation. But the most significant
imprint of responsive regulation on this article is methodological. Reflecting upon responsive regulation as a methodological project invites
us to probe more closely the potential application of a ―Braithwaitean‖
methodology to large project research.
Braithwaite‘s 1992 book (with Ian Ayres), Responsive Regulation:
Transcending the Deregulation Debate,8 combines careful empirical
investigation, ambitious meta-analysis, and dynamic theorizing. It
represents precisely the type of big-picture research that is lacking in
the large project context. The authors offer a synthesis of regulatory
insights gleaned from an expansive study of diverse industries, coun4

See Barry Barton, ―The Theoretical Context of Regulation‖ in Barry Barton et al,
Regulating, supra note 1, 11 at 23–24, citing Julia Black, ―Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‗Post-Regulatory‘
World‖ (2004) 54:1 Curr Legal Probs 103.

5

John Braithwaite, ―Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies‖ (2006)
34:5 World Development 884 at 886 [citation omitted] [Braithwaite, ―Developing
Economies‖].

6

John Braithwaite, ―The Essence of Responsive Regulation‖ (2011) 44:3 UBC L
Rev 475 at 482, figure 1 [Braithwaite, ―Essence‖].

7

Ibid at 508, citing Peter Drahos, ―Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets:
A Nodal Governance Approach‖ (2004) 77:2 Temp L Rev 401.

8

Supra note 3.
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tries, and social contexts. The theory is dynamic, and the learning is
ongoing. The refinement of the theory of responsive regulation offered
in this volume is evidence of this fact.9
When one reflects upon the methodological project of Braithwaite‘s
ongoing work on responsive regulation, one sees the many parallels
with his contributions to other areas of scholarship—his study with Peter Drahos of global business regulation,10 his work on restorative justice,11 and his current project with Val Braithwaite, Hilary
Charlesworth, and Kate Macfarlane on peacebuilding.12 Each of these
studies is ambitious in its scope and involves the synthesis of a significant body of new research and theory. Peacebuilding Compared is conceived as a twenty-year research project to code 670 variables in relation to armed conflicts that have raged across the planet since 1990.13
Global Business Regulation encompasses over ten years of research,
more than five hundred interviews, and a final text of 629 pages. The
book, like much Braithwaite‘s work, combines close empirical investigation of individual case studies (gained through extensive field work
and interviews) with a meta-analytic approach that situates these individual case studies within a rich, theoretically-informed understanding
of context. Case studies stand alone as valuable empirical accounts. But
combined, these case studies provide the basis for integrated theories of
governance and regulation, with potentially widespread application.
The combination of close empirical investigation, policy-oriented prescription, and theoretical rigour is rare in work of such expansive scope.
This is exactly the sort of work that is needed now in the area of environmental regulation of large projects.
9

Braithwaite, ―Essence‖, supra note 6.

10

John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

11

See e.g. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

12

See e.g. John Braithwaite et al, Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment:
Sequencing Peace in Bougainville (Canberra: Australian National University E
Press, 2010).

13

John Braithwaite et al, Anomie and Violence: Non-Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding (Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2010)
2.
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The objective of this article is to help set the stage for the emergence
of such empirically-informed, interdisciplinary, and theoretically nuanced research on large projects. The article is organized in three parts.
In the next section, I tackle the question ―why study large projects?‖ I
then describe the contours of environmental regulation in the large project context, with a preliminary mapping of existing scholarship. In the
final section, I turn to a discussion of the methods of large project research, and suggest three points of entry through which environmental
regulatory research might develop in large project contexts: (1) through
contracts, (2) through monitoring and oversight, and (3) through references to ―international standards‖. The conclusion turns to the methodological demands of building and synthesizing project-specific research.
II.

WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS?
Asking why regulatory scholars should study large projects amounts to
asking two questions: (1) why adopt a project-specific lens for regulatory study? and (2) why focus this lens on the subset of large projects?
To answer the first question, individual projects provide ―strategic research sites‖ for a grounded understanding of how regulatory webs
function.14 Scholarship on environmental regulation often adopts a lens
which focuses on a particular regulatory technique (for example, environmental impact assessment, environmental taxes, permitting, litigation, environmental disclosures, socially responsible investment, selfregulation, or principles-based regulation). In contrast, by adopting a
project-specific lens, the actual functioning and interaction of multilayered regulatory practices can be understood in a fine-grained and
highly contextualized manner. The ways in which environmental regulatory tools complement or undermine each other may be appreciated
by mapping the regulatory webs that govern individual projects.

14

Robert Merton uses the term ―strategic research site‖ to refer to ―sites, objects, or
events that exhibit the phenomena to be explained or interpreted to such advantage
and in such accessible form that they enable the fruitful investigation of previously
stubborn problems and the discovery of new problems for further inquiry.‖ See Robert K Merton, ―Three Fragments from a Sociologist‘s Notebooks: Establishing the
Phenomenon, Specified Ignorance, and Strategic Research Materials‖ (1987) 13
Annual Review of Sociology 1 at 1–2.
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Secondly, why do ―large‖ projects deserve particular attention? To
answer this, the specific nature of large projects needs to be better explored. Large projects can be defined as natural resource or infrastructure projects costing five hundred million dollars or more.15 In the case
of dams, they are often defined by physical size.16 These definitions, on
their own, may fail to give a real sense of these projects. A better understanding of their scale and complexity emerges from thinking about the
contractual and regulatory webs by which they are governed. A typical
large project may involve fifteen or more contracting parties from a
number of different countries, tied together through over forty major
contracts.17 For example, the financing piece alone for the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline required 208 finance documents and more than 17,000
signatures from 78 parties.18
The world‘s growing demand for energy and natural resources, coupled with the exhaustion of easily accessible natural resource deposits,
means that international oil and mining companies are initiating large
projects in remote areas that have been relatively untouched by major
industrial activity. These projects involve billions of dollars of capital.
Their scope is such that host countries have never seen, let alone attempted to regulate, projects of this magnitude. Many of these projects,
particularly pipeline projects, are multi-jurisdictional.
A new generation of large projects introduces particular social and
ecological risks. These risks emerge with the use of untested or highly
15

This definition is adopted from Benjamin C Esty, ―Why Study Large Projects? An
Introduction to Research on Project Finance‖ (2004) 10:2 European Financial Management 213 at 214, 218 (citing major mines, pipelines, oilfields, toll roads,
bridges, telecommunication systems, and power plants as common examples of
large projects).

16

For example, the International Commission on Large Dams defines a large dam to
mean ―a dam with a height of fifteen metres or more from the foundation.‖ If dams
are between five and fifteen metres high and have a reservoir volume of more than
three million cubic metres, they are also classified as large dams; see World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making—The Report of the World Commission on Dams (London: Earthscan, 2000) at
11.

17

Esty, supra note 15 at 216. These parties may include sponsors and contractors,
suppliers, host governments, and lenders.

18

Hugh Pope, ―Caspian Pipeline Financing Solidifies U.S. Policy‖, Wall Street Journal (3 February 2004) A13.
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invasive technologies (e.g., genetic manipulation, nuclear fission, or
chemical hydraulic fracking), the extension of extractive activities into
hostile environments (e.g., deep oceans, polar regions, or tropical rainforests), and the challenges that arise through operations in especially
corrupt regimes and settings of historic and current conflicts and violence. These realities point to a unique aspect of large project regulation: their very scope often requires broad reforms of national regulatory regimes. Like large industrial disasters, large projects motivate
regulatory reform and innovation.19 A conventional approach to regulatory analysis focuses on how regulation shapes a particular project. The
magnitude of large projects means that an equally relevant inquiry is the
extent to which a particular project irrevocably alters the nature and
practices of regulation in a particular jurisdiction. Large projects leave
an indelible mark, not only on business practices in a jurisdiction, but
also on legal and regulatory regimes.
The majority of scholarship on regulation focuses on a set of assumptions that have developed through the study of regulatory contexts
featuring single dominant regulators, who are governmental actors, operating in the context of developed countries. In contrast, large projects
involve multiple regulators (often with conflicting mandates), powerful
non-state actors, and while projects frequently (but not exclusively)
occur in developing countries, many regulators are transnational. The
large project context thus provides an opportunity to explore how well
elements of regulatory theory ―travel‖ to settings distinct from those in
which these elements were initially described.
Based on these initial observations of the nature of large projects, I
turn now to further explore two explanations for why large projects
provide a productive setting in which to study environmental regulation
and potentially extend existing regulatory theories. The first is that large
projects offer strategic research sites for understanding the interaction
of regulatory webs. The second is that the scale of large projects means
that project-specific regulation may critically shape future law and practice in a project‘s jurisdiction.

19

See Fiona Hanes, Globalization and Regulatory Character: Regulatory Reform
After the Kader Toy Factory Fire (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) for a thoughtful account of post-disaster regulatory reform in Thailand.
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A. THE INTERACTION OF REGULATORY WEBS

In suggesting that large projects provide a useful research site for understanding the interaction of regulatory approaches, I draw attention to
the fact that these projects are of such scale and complexity that issues
of environmental regulation are necessarily multi-layered. Regulation,
defined in the context of large projects, is an expansive concept. It can
be seen as ―the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes.‖20 This definition
encompasses regulation by a range of state and non-state actors (NGOs,
private banks, and insurers, to name a few) which are critical sources of
regulation in large project contexts. It extends beyond standard-setting,
the licensing and permitting of new projects, and the enforcement of
conditions on existing projects, to acknowledge the regulatory significance of broader anticipatory processes to accommodate large projects,
including attention to the cumulative effects of multiple projects, and
strategic-level considerations of regional futures and sectoral policy
implications. Such a definition moves regulation far beyond a consideration of targeted rules which are enforced. Large projects offer particularly rich terrain for understanding the interplay between state regulation and private orderings, as well as the operation of hybrid forms of
regulation. The regulatory experiences of large projects can thus extend
current understandings of regulation in important ways.
Defining ―environmental‖ regulation in the large project setting is
problematic. Arriving at satisfactory definitions of environmental law,
environmental governance, and environmental regulation plague all of
these areas of study. Environmental regulation, used here, extends beyond a biophysical notion of the environment, and beyond an approach
to regulation that confines its mandate to pollution control or species
protection. But its contours are difficult to fix. This is why it is tempting
to speak of the ―environmental aspects of large project regulation‖
rather than ―environmental regulation‖. This label better captures the
fact that we are talking about regulation that has environmental effects
rather than regulation that necessarily emanates from a government department of the environment. But it is a cumbersome moniker. The
20

Julia Black, ―Critical Reflections on Regulation‖ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of
Legal Philosophy 1 at 26.
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same terminological dilemma results in many law schools hosting centres for ―law and the environment‖ rather than centres for ―environmental law‖. Environmental law, like environmental regulation, risks
too narrowly confining the parameters of the subject.21
Environmental regulation in this broader context explores a diversity
of regulatory tools that are used to respond to environmental challenges. It includes ―complicated mixtures of established legal concepts,
sui generis reforms, non-legal regulatory ideals, policy and legal norms
from a range of different jurisdictions.‖22 Environmental regulation
emerges from a number of sources without explicit environmental protection mandates. For example, many categories of law impact the environmental regulatory space of a large project: environmental law, financial law, corporate law, insurance law, contract law, public law, international law, property law, torts. The environmental regulators of a large
project may be international insurance companies, project finance companies, development agencies, communities, activist organizations, project partners, lenders and investors, parent companies, and arbitrators—
as well as national and local government officials.
For legal scholars, the multiplicity of regulators and sites of regulation poses considerable challenges as it demands a transcendence of
disciplinary borders and bodies of expertise. An understanding of the
tax and royalty regime applicable to a project may be critical to understanding environmental regulation. Knowledge of how international
construction contract terms are interpreted by international arbitral bodies may also be required. The way in which a global corporation has
applied industry standards to its operations worldwide might lend further insights into the environmental regime that will apply to the specific project. One danger inherent in research that focuses on ―environmental regulation‖ is that project-specific regimes for addressing environmental mitigation or ―environmental safeguards‖ become the sole
subjects of inquiry.
Project-specific regulation involves ―regulatory networks‖ or ―regulatory webs‖ where the identity of the key environmental regulator or
21

See Richard Macrory, ―Maturity and Methodology: A Personal Reflection‖ (2009)
21:2 J Envtl L 251 at 252.

22

Elizabeth Fisher et al, ―Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship‖ (2009) 21:2 J Envtl L 213 at 225.

530

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL. 44:3

regulators may not be immediately apparent.23 In many projects, environmental regulation may be shared among many governmental departments. In federal states, this regulation may be split among departments of mining, wildlife, environment, and water, at both the regional
and federal levels. Critical non-state actors such as international financial institutions, NGOs, and insurance companies may take on key
regulatory roles.24 But to suggest that these state and non-state actors
form webs or networks is only the first step in regulatory analysis. Understanding the ways in which diverse regulatory actors complement
(or, conversely, undermine) each other also requires elucidation and
more nuanced use of the term ―networks‖. Put another way, large project-focused research demands the development and articulation of
more rigorous techniques for understanding the interrelationships between local, regional, national, and international environmental forms
of regulation, and state and non-state regulators.
In John Braithwaite‘s most recent work on responsive regulation
(and the subject of this issue), he describes an explicit role for networking pyramidal governance by engaging wider networks of partners in
the use of pyramids of support and sanction.25 Intuitively, a networked
pyramidal structure appears to describe well some of the tools available
to regulators working in large project contexts—particularly in developing countries, where the capacity of government regulators may be limited.26 However, a closer look at large projects suggests that a model
that posits a government regulator ―harnessing‖ or mobilizing non-state
actors such as local and transnational NGOs may overstate the degree
of cooperation between these actors.27

23

See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 10 at 7, for a fuller discussion of regulatory
webs.

24

See e.g. Yinka O Omorogbe, ―Alternative Regulation and Governance Reform in
Resource-Rich Developing Countries in Africa‖ in Barry Barton et al, Regulating,
supra note 1, 39 at 41 (examining regulation by actors ―other than the authorities
whose function it is to make law and regulation within the territory in question‖).

25

See Braithwaite, ―Essence‖, supra note 6 at 507; Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 3
at 38–40.

26

Braithwaite, ―Developing Economies‖, supra note 5 at 889.

27

The use of networks to harness non-state actors is discussed by Braithwaite, ibid at
889–96. The capacity of a government regulator to ―mobilize cheaper forms of so-
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NGOs each have their own agendas in large project debates, and the
single-issue focus of some of these groups may function to undermine
the partnership potential of these networks.28 The same can be said for
socially responsible investors or insurance companies. In other words,
―constellations‖ of regulatory actors that appear as networks may not
actually operate as networks.29 Their manifestation may reflect only an
ephemeral convergence of interests. The points of disagreement between the state regulator and the non-state network partner may be so
acute that the network functions to undermine the functioning of the
regulatory pyramid rather than to enhance it. Understanding how regulatory networking works also involves an appreciation of the ways in
which an environmental regulator perceives environmental issues fitting into the wider package of large project regulation. Issues framed as
―environmental‖ often disguise other regulatory concerns.
B. THE IMPACT OF PROJECTS ON REGULATORY REGIMES

The second reason I offer for studying large projects is that the scale of
these projects means they leave an ineffaceable mark on the regulatory
frameworks of the countries where they occur. Sierra Leone introduced
new mining legislation to facilitate the Koidu Kimberlite and Sierra
Rutile projects.30 Madagascar‘s QIT Madagascar Minerals project, the
first large scale mining project in the country by a private investor, led
cial control‖ (ibid at 884) may be as limited as the regulator‘s capacity to regulate
through command-and-control mechanisms.
28

For a critical look at NGO interests in the large project context, see Sebastian Mallaby, ―NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor‖, Foreign Policy (1 September
2004) 50.

29

I thank Susan Sturm for the useful image of the regulatory ―constellation‖.

30

This legislative reform includes the introduction of the Koidu Project Mining Lease
(Modification and Ratification) Act 2002, Act No 6 of 2002 (KPML), and the Sierra Rutile (Ratification) Act 2002, Act No 4 of 2002 (SRA), as well as development
of a Core Mineral Policy. This legislation includes environmental requirements. For
example, the KPML sets out provisions limiting pollution, restricting the use of water and addressing the environmental impacts on affected communities (clauses
6:3:1, 11:3). For a more thorough discussion of this legislation, see Priscilla
Schwartz, ―Corporate Activities and Environmental Justice: Perspectives on Sierra
Leone‘s Mining‖ in Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa, eds, Environmental Law
and Justice in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 429 at 434.
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to the enactment of new national mining legislation.31 In Uganda, the
discovery of large oil deposits in the Lake Albert region by companies
such as Heritage Oil culminated in the drafting of the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010.32
National legal reform and project approval often proceed in tandem as a
result of World Bank Group interventions in a country. These interventions include ―rewriting laws (particularly related to the regulation of
natural resources, the environment, and property rights); restructuring
state agencies that regulate the environment . . . and funding large-scale
‗green‘ infrastructural projects.‖33 Each of these interventions is linked.
In developed economies, we also see project-specific regulatory innovations emerge in response to the seemingly one-off challenges of
large projects. These project-specific regulatory tools often become entrenched in regulatory practices, alter expectations, and lead to legislative reform.34 Large projects also have significant potential effects on
regional development futures, sectoral policy development, and patterns
of dependencies between nations.
Individual projects do not only impact domestic environmental regulation through legislative reform; treaty instruments and contracts also
alter domestic regulatory practices. For example, the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) oil pipeline introduced a new international treaty among
the host states to ―ensure the principle of the freedom of transit of pe-

31

Brunno Sarrasin, ―Mining and Protection of the Environment in Madagascar‖ in
Bonnie Campbell, ed, Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development (London:
Pluto, 2009) 150 at 155–56.

32

See e.g. Robert D Langenkamp, ―Comments on the Uganda Petroleum Bill‖ (8 July
2010), online: Revenue Watch International <http://www.revenuewatch.org>.

33

Michael Goldman, ―Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-Governmentality
and Other Transnational Practices of a ‗Green‘ World Bank‖ (2001) 48:4 Soc Probs
499 at 506.

34

See Natasha A Affolder, ―Rethinking Environmental Contracting‖ (2010) 21 J Envtl
L & Prac 155. The negotiation of an environmental agreement to govern the Ekati
Mine is an example of one such regulatory innovation that created expectations on
the part of project-affected communities that other large mines would include similar agreements. The agreement formed a regulatory prototype for other large mining
projects, and major proposed projects now are accompanied by demands for similar
agreements.
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troleum.‖35 This treaty will have repercussions for environmental regulation of the project across the region as it provides for the freezing of
local regulatory law, and an expedited process for the expropriation of
land needed by the pipeline.36
This issue of scale further explains the fact that large projects often
attract their own sets of rules. Motivated by the promise of significant
economic activity, there have been efforts in a number of jurisdictions
to ―streamline‖ the environmental reviews of large projects, creating
distinct environmental review processes which only apply to projects of
a certain scale. The rationale for exempting large projects from the project-review rules that would otherwise apply emanates from concerns
about the ―regulatory burden‖ of multi-jurisdictional review for large
projects.37 A few examples illustrate this point. In a spirit of encouraging ―efficiency‖ and ―streamlining‖ the regulation of large natural resource projects, the Government of Canada introduced a Major Projects
Management Office in 2007.38 In 2005, the Government of New South
Wales introduced a Major Projects Assessment System based on legislation to streamline environmental review regulations for major projects
in the state and to ―remove red tape‖ to help New South Wales ―remain
35

Agreement Among The Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and The Republic of Turkey
Relating to the Transportation of Petroleum Via the Territories of The Azerbaijan
Republic, Georgia and The Republic of Turkey Through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Main Export Pipeline (preamble), 18 November 1999, online:
<http://subsites.bp.com> [Agreement]. See Abigail S Reyes, ―Protecting the ‗Freedom of Transit of Petroleum‘: Transnational Lawyers Making (Up) International
Law in the Caspian‖ (2006) 24 Berkeley J Int‘l L 842.

36

Agreement, supra note 35 (Articles II(4)(iv) and IV).

37

See e.g. Conference Board of Canada, Making Canada More Competitive: Improving Major Project Regulation in Canada (Toronto: Conference Board of Canada,
2008).

38

See Canada, Major Projects Management Office, Reports and Publications: Cabinet Directive on Improving the Performance of the Regulatory System for Major
Resource Projects (October 2007), online: MPMO <http://www.mpmobggp.gc.ca>. The Major Projects Management Office (MPMO) is part of the Department of Natural Resources, and is the result of the Cabinet Directive on Improving the Performance of the Regulatory System for Major Resource Projects. For
each major resource project, the MPMO forms a ―Project Agreement‖ which sets
out specific responsibilities and timelines for each governmental department involved in regulatory approval to help streamline the regulatory process (ibid at Part
I(a)(2)).
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Australia‘s economic powerhouse.‖39 The UK‘s Planning Act 2008 created a new institution, the Infrastructure Planning Commission,40 with
the goal of ―streamlin[ing] the planning system for nationally significant infrastructure projects.‖41
Even absent specific legislation creating unique pathways for the review of large projects, the wide discretionary powers of decisionmakers in certain jurisdictions to scope individual projects for environmental assessment implies that, in practice, large projects can be subject
to distinct rules and processes. For example, in Canada, a recent legislative change may allow for the exemption of certain large projects, or
aspects thereof, from environmental review.42
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LARGE PROJECTS:
MAPPING THE FIELD
An attempt to take stock of the field of scholarship that applies a project-specific lens to the environmental regulation of large projects leads
to a few immediate conclusions. A first observation is that large projects
do not feature in textbooks of environmental law or international environmental law. This points to a glaring gap in the scholarship: work that
offers a synthesis of existing case studies—that builds, reflects upon,
and identifies issues that cut across a range of projects. And it also suggests that large project regulation is not routinely taught as an aspect of
environmental law.
39

Austl, NSW, Department of Planning, A Community Guide: NSW Major Projects
Assessment System (March 2006), online: NSW Planning <http://www.planning
.nsw.gov.au> at 2. The relevant regulatory provisions to enable the Projects Assessment System include an amendment to Part 3A of the Environmental Planning
and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) and a new environmental planning instrument, the
State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (NSW).

40

Planning Act 2008 (UK), c 29, s 1(1).

41

UK, Infrastructure Planning Commission, ―Our Role‖ (2010), online: <http://
infrastructure.independent.gov.uk>.

42

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, ss 15(1), 7.1(2), as
amended by Jobs and Economic Growth Act, SC 2010, c 12, part 20, which allows
the Minister of the Environment to limit the scope of an environmental assessment
―to one or more components of that project‖ and to exempt federally funded public
utility projects (enumerated in the schedule to the Environmental Assessment Act)
from environmental assessment.
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Existing case studies that adopt a project-specific lens, mostly with
different foci and emphases, stand alone. They are not integrated within
a wider literature, and attempts to learn from these project-specific experiences are also stifled. In this section, I draw together some of these
diverse case studies of individual projects to begin to sketch the contours of a body of work that adopts a project-specific lens to illuminate
the environmental aspects of large project regulation. Much of this
work is being produced by graduate students; this fact likely speaks to
the time and travel demands of in-depth field work. Many single case
studies offer a vision of large project regulation at a fixed point in time;
this limits available accounts of the dynamism of large project regulation over long periods. The existing scholarship is also generally prescriptive. It often has an advocacy bent. It is uneven. Scholarship clusters around a few topics of particular interest, including the environmental impacts of actual,43 proposed,44 and even hypothetical45 large
projects, and the adequacy of environmental assessment regimes for
these projects.46 A recent Australian book, for example, takes a projectspecific focus to scrutinizing large project developments across Australia and the role of environmental assessment in project approvals.47 The
rather universal conclusions of this body of work are that environmental
43

See e.g. Ndenecho Emmanuel Neba & Banyuy Paul Ngeh, ―Environmental Assessment of the Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project in the Kribi Region of
Cameroon‖ (2009) 4:5 International NGO Journal 225.

44

See e.g. Timothy Van Hinte, Managing Impacts of Major Projects: An Analysis of
the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Proposal (Master of Resource Management Thesis,
Simon Fraser University School of Resource and Environmental Management,
2005), online: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca> [unpublished].

45

See e.g. Kenneth S Culotta, ―Recipe for a Tex-Mex Pipeline Project: Considerations
in Permitting a Cross-Border Gas Transportation Project‖ (2004) 39:2 Tex Int‘l LJ
287.

46

See e.g. Sarah Njoki Macharia, ―A Framework for Best Practice Environmental
Impact Assessment Follow-up: A Case Study of the Ekati Diamond Mine, Canada‖
(MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2005) [unpublished]; Ari Hershowitz, ―A
Solid Foundation: Belize‘s Chalillo Dam and Environmental Decisionmaking‖
(2008) 35:1 Ecology LQ 73; Sanjay Jose Mullick, ―Power Game in India: Environmental Clearance and the Enron Project‖ (1997) 16 Stan Envtl LJ 256.

47

Tim Bonyhady & Andrew Macintosh, eds, Mills, Mines and Other Controversies:
The Environmental Assessment of Major Projects (Annandale: The Federation
Press, 2010).
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assessment processes, and particularly environmental assessment follow-up, are inadequate.48
The transnational nature of large project regulation is also attracting
attention. Scholarship addressing the environmental regulatory regime
for the BTC oil pipeline project, for example, draws attention to the
ways in which large project regulation can be delocalized and transnational treaties can become the prevailing legal regime;49 it also examines the environmental problems likely to emerge from the insulation of
the pipeline project from domestic law.50 Sanjeev Khagram‘s work on
resistance to dam projects has documented the multiple sites of environmental regulation, including federal government, state, the World
Bank, NGOs, and grassroots.51 A collection of essays and several individual articles address the environmental policy, law, and liability considerations applicable to the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project.52 The
link between financing and environmental regulation is explored
through a study of the Three Gorges Dam where World Bank Group
financing for the project was denied because it did not conform with the
Bank‘s environmental guidelines.53 David Szablowski offers a case
study of the Antamina Mine in Peru which highlights the selective absence of the state in regulating conflicts between the company and the
affected community.54 In his study of the P&O Port Project in Dahanu,
48

See e.g. Neba & Ngeh, supra note 46; Macharia, supra note 46. See also Judith
Kimerling, ―Recent Development: The Environmental Audit of Texaco‘s Amazon
Oil Fields: Environmental Justice of Business as Usual?‖ (1994) 7 Harv Hum Rts J
199, outlining the weaknesses of an environmental audit of Texaco‘s oilfield operations in the Amazon.

49

See Reyes, supra note 35.

50

See Christopher PM Waters, ―Who Should Regulate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline?‖ (2004) 16:3 Geo Int‘l Envtl L Rev 403.

51

See Sanjeev Khagram, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water
and Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

52

See SA Bronkhorst, ed, Liability for Environmental Damage and the World Bank’s
Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for
IUCN, 2000); Edwin Mujih, ―The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operating in Developing Countries: a Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project‖
(2008) 16:1 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 83.

53

William Shapiro, ―Human Rights and the Environment: IV. China‘s Three Gorges
Dam‖ (1998) 9 Colo J Int‘l Envtl L & Pol‘y [YB] 146 at 154.

54

David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
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India, Oren Perez documents the community struggle against an international project to build what would be the biggest deep-water port in
India.55 This account highlights the limits of efforts to regulate multinational enterprises in large projects where the environmental ramifications are significant.
Industry-specific attempts at synthesis have also contributed to the
understanding of certain types of large projects. The World Commission
on Dams spawned an entire industry of dam studies.56 Dam projects are
now the sites of a considerable number of project-specific studies.57 The
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project58 and the World
Bank‘s Extractive Industries Review process59 both established important benchmarks for further work on governance of extractive industry
projects. Oil and gas projects, and particularly pipelines,60 have also
55

Oren Perez, ―Reflections on an Environmental Struggle: P&O, Dahanu, and the
Regulation of Multinational Enterprises‖ (2002) 15:1 Georgetown Int‘l Envtl L Rev
1 at 14–15.

56

See e.g. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework
for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000); Deborah Moore, John Dore & Dipak Gyawali, ―The World Commission on Dams + 10: Revisiting the Large Dam
Controversy‖ 3:2 (2010) Water Alternatives 3; Peter Bosshard, ―The Dam Industry,
the World Commission on Dams and the HSAF Process‖ (2010) 3:2 Water Alternatives 58.

57

See e.g. William F Fisher, ed, Toward Sustainable Development?: Struggling Over
India’s Narmada River (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1995); Philippe Cullet, ed, The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: Selected Documents (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Wilson
Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, ―Uncertainties in the Amazon Hydropower
Development: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues around the Belo Monte
Dam‖ (2010) 3:2 Water Alternatives 249; Maarit Virtanen, ―Foreign Direct Investment and Hydropower in Lao PDR: The Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project‖
(2006) 13:4 Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management 183.

58

See International Institute for Environment and Development, Breaking New
Ground: The Report of the Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development Project
(London: Earthscan, 2002).

59

See The World Bank Oil, Gas, Mining Unit, Extractive Industries Review Reports,
online: <http://go.worldbank.org>. The Extractive Industries Review consists of six
volumes of reports with a total of more than twenty individual reports.

60

See e.g. Michael M Wenig & Patricia Sutherland, ―Considering the Upstream
/Downstream Effects of the Mackenzie Pipeline: Rough Paddling for the National
Energy Board‖ (2004) 86 Resources 1, online: Canadian Institute of Resources Law
<http://www.cirl.ca>; Van Hinte, supra note 44.
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generated a project-specific literature, as have nuclear projects.61 In
Canada, the tar sands are the subject of a growing body of research on
environmental regulation.62
Collections of case studies also attempt to shed empirical light on
the use of corporate self-regulation in the environmental context.
Noeleen McNamara, in a recent doctoral thesis, draws on case studies
of large gold mines in Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, and Queensland,
to address whether self-regulatory mechanisms are more important than
formal legislation in motivating compliance with environmental laws.63
These studies are valuable, but most often they offer a single-point-intime perspective of regulatory practices. Missing is a more long-term
view of the interactive and dynamic regulatory relationships at stake.
Particularly in the mining and oil and gas sectors, where mergers and
acquisitions are so frequent, the key subjects of regulation can be constantly moving targets. This may offer particular challenges for responsive approaches to regulation where individual relationships are critical.
Detailed case studies that adopt a pluralist lens to the regulation of
projects allow us to grasp the multiple layers of project-specific environmental regulation. Among the few examples of this work, Priscilla
Schwartz‘s study of the Koidu Kimberlite Mining Project in Sierra
Leone stands out as a rich and nuanced example of project-specific
regulatory scholarship.64 She reveals how environmental regulation of
61

Edward D Bayda, ―The Adequacy of the Public Inquiry Process for Assessing Major Nuclear Facilities‖ (1980) 45:1 Sask L Rev 3; Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd
(AECL), Nuclear Energy Inquiries: National and International, Report AECL10768 by JAL Robertson (Chalk River: AECL, 1993).

62

See e.g. Pierre Gosslin et al, The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel: Environmental and Health Impacts of Canada's Oil Sands Industry (Ottawa: Royal Society
of Canada, 2010); Constance D Hunt & Alistair R Lucas, Environmental Regulation: Its Impact on Major Oil and Gas Projects: Oil Sands and Arctic (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1980); Oil Sands Advisory Panel, A Foundation
for the Future: Building an Environmental Monitoring System for the Oil Sands
(Ottawa: Minister of Environment, 2010); Steven A Kennett, ―Next Steps for Cumulative Effects Management in Alberta‘s Athabasca Oil Sands Region‖ (2006) 96
Resources 1, online: Canadian Institute of Resources Law <http://www.cirl.ca>.

63

Noeleen McNamara, The Environmental Regulation of Mining: An International
Comparison (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern Queensland 2009), online:
<http://eprints.usq.edu.au>.

64

See Schwartz, supra note 30.
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the project operates through lease agreements, mining laws and policies, loan agreements, environmental assessment practices, World Bank
guidelines, and contractual terms including requirements to comply
with applicable ‖rules of international law‖ and ―best international
standards‖. She further contextualizes this discussion of project regulation by situating the project within the institutional limitations which
hamper enforcement of environmental laws in Sierra Leone including
―state-centric albeit uncoordinated bureaucratic processes, corruption,
ill-defined responsibilities between departments and lack of technical
capacity on the part of regulatory bodies.‖65
Research on large project regulation admittedly faces a number of
barriers to entry. This may explain the dearth of academic research.
Large projects are few and regarded as idiosyncratic. They are contextspecific to such a degree that lessons may not be immediately translated
to other contexts. Obtaining detailed information on these projects is
challenging due to the private and often confidential nature of the governing contractual regimes. Given the highly contested nature of many
of these projects, ―honest numbers‖ are hard to find.66 And understanding the applicable webs of regulation demands time-consuming and indepth field work.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LARGE PROJECTS:
A RESEARCH AGENDA
While synthesis of existing studies of the environmental aspects of
large project regulation may be lacking, the financial and economic development dimensions of large project success and failure are the subject of enormous popular, political, and scholarly interest.67 The insights
that emerge from taking a closer looking at environmental regulation
are likely to be of broader significance—and interest—as an aspect of
65

Ibid at 437.

66

See Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius & Werner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk:
An Anatomy of Ambition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 5. Megaprojects are not a field of ―honest numbers‖. Disputes around these projects are
rife with allegations of bias in the work of environmental professionals.

67

See e.g. Erik J Woodhouse, ―The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment
in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries‖ (2006) 38:2 NYUJ Int‘l L &
Pol 121.

540

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL. 44:3

large project regulation. Understanding project-specific regulatory contexts may elucidate trends of wider regulatory significance, given the
fact that many regulators, particularly in the developing world, are repeat actors in multiple projects. For example, aside from the ―usual
suspects‖ such as international financial institutions, the private project
sponsors are often the same in different countries, and the main international NGOs are often the same (for example, International Rivers for
dam projects).
There is value in complementing conventional approaches to studying environmental regulation (which focus on permitting and environmental impact assessments) with understandings of de-centred approaches to regulation at the project level. These include studies of environmental regulation of projects through socially responsible investment, environmental insurance, project finance mechanisms, selfregulation, standard-setting initiatives, and contractual mechanisms. In
this section, I explore three particular opportunities for such research
that might further elucidate the value of a broad conception of regulatory tools, and the potential for regulatory advance through the careful
development of a well-conceived suite of these tools. The three examples of such tools I discuss are: (1) contracts, (2) project oversight and
monitoring, and (3) international standards.
To date, early examples of this research have emerged in the context
of international investment law. This has the consequence of conceptualizing large project regulation as a ―developing country‖ issue. John
Braithwaite‘s 2006 essay on ―Responsive Regulation and Developing
Economies‖ offers particularly helpful reflections on the challenges and
opportunities for responsive approaches in developing countries.68 But
large project regulation is not only an issue impacting developing countries. One goal of this essay is to highlight the challenges of large project governance that transcend national borders and affect all countries,
regardless of the nomenclature used to classify their level of economic
development. A narrow focus that conceives large project regulation as
an aspect of foreign investment law obscures the experimentation taking place around large project regulation in diverse contexts.

68

Braithwaite, ―Developing Economies‖, supra note 5.
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A. THE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF LARGE PROJECT GOVERNANCE

Contracts are central to large project regulation. They provide a key
mechanism for environmental regulation of project operations. Loan
agreements, insurance agreements, investment agreements, construction
contracts, environmental agreements, and community benefit agreements are just a few examples of contracts that adopt environmental
regulatory functions. The environmental significance of contracts can
be obscured for a number of reasons. First, these contracts may not be
public and thus their terms may be unknown. Second, as a form of private law, the wider public and political significance of contracts can
easily be missed. And third, the environmental regulatory aspects of
contracts may be buried in larger contractual documents that address
other issues. Contracts are highly contextualized instruments that can
fine tune regulatory responses to the challenges of specific situations
and unknown contingencies. They can provide for environmental performance bonds or security deposits, which provide a ―stick‖ should
negotiated attempts to secure environmental outcomes fail. But contractual provisions can equally entrench environmental disregard and fail to
provide for responsive approaches to environmentally destructive behaviour.
In the setting of large projects, contracts are critical because so many
aspects of regulation are one-off and negotiated. For example, in international investment contracts, project-specific commitments have been
concluded through stabilization clauses that freeze environmental laws
and constrain the ability of host states to raise environmental standards
in project settings and comply with international environmental law.69
Stabilization clauses are contractual commitments not to interfere with
the regulatory framework governing an investment project.70 These
commitments typically can be found in contracts between global natural
resource companies (or their local subsidiaries) and host governments.
69

See Lorenzo Cotula, ―Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental
Standards in Foreign Investment Contracts‖ (2006) 17:1 YB Int‘l Env L 111.

70

See Peter Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Evaristus Oshionebo, ―Stabilization
Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic and Social Implications for Developing Countries‖ 10 Asper Review of International Business
and Trade Law 1.
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The clause may involve a commitment by the government not to alter
the regulatory framework for the project, through legislation or other
means, without the consent of the other contracting party, in effect
freezing regulation as it applies to the contract; it may also provide for
compensation of the investor for the economic impact of any new regulation. Clauses may also specify compensation or ―restoration of the
economic equilibrium‖ of the project in the event that a regulatory
change causes prejudice to the project.71 Such clauses are intended to
address investors‘ lack of confidence in the legal systems of developing
countries.
But contractual clauses cannot be examined in isolation. It is the interaction between contract law and bilateral investment treaties that
provides a more complete regulatory picture. Stabilization clauses can
have a chilling effect on the introduction of new environmental regulation.72 But the entrenching effect of the terms of bilateral investment
treaties may be more significant. Understanding contractual commitments in the context of bilateral investment treaties is made all the more
pressing by recent robust arbitral interpretations of investor protections,
including umbrella clauses and standards of fair and equitable treatment
(FET), in these treaties. Umbrella clauses ―create an international law
obligation that a host state shall, for example, ‗observe any obligation it
may have entered to‘; ‗constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into‘; or ‗observe any obligation it has as-

71

Host Government Agreement between and Among the Government of Turkey and
[the MEP Participants] (19 October 2000) [Turkish HGA], articles 7.2(xi), 10.1(iii)
& 10.3 [Turkish HGA], one of a series of contracts emerging as part of the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Project.

72

One way to counteract the effect of stabilization contracts has been to attempt to
negotiate environmental or human rights exemptions to broad stabilization clauses.
For example, due to civil society protest, the BTC consortium made a unilateral
commitment not to interpret the stabilization clause included in agreements such as
the Turkish HGA, ibid, in such a way as to prevent host state regulation promoting
human rights and environmental goals. This undertaking provided that such regulation for human rights and environmental purposes met certain requirements which
were directed to prevent host country abuse of this commitment. See Baku-TbilisiCeyhan Pipeline Company, BTC Human Rights Undertaking (22 September 2003),
online: BP Caspian <http://subsites
.bp.com>.

2011

WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS

543

sumed‘.‖73 FET standards are also a common feature of bilateral investment treaties, and they form part of the investment chapters of economic integration agreements such as free trade agreements. As one
author explains, ―[t]oday, non-compliance with the FET clause is the
most alleged breach in international investment arbitrations, along with
the protection against expropriation.‖74
The contractual clauses discussed above are rare examples of
clauses in the public domain. Certain foreign investment contracts and
many project documents are not publicly available. Those that are may
only be accessible through costly subscription services, or made publicly available only under pressure exerted by international financial
institutions (including recent reforms to the World Bank‘s disclosure
policies).75 This demonstrates the concern that networked forms of environmental regulation can be compromised by a lack of access to key
contractual provisions.76
73

Katia Yannaca-Small, ―Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements‖ in OECD, International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and
Tracking Innovations, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org> 101 at 102. See also
Jarrod Wong, ―Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed
Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes‖ (2006) 14:1 Geo Mason L Rev 135.
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Sebastián López Escarcena, ―The Elements of Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law‖, Policy Brief No 14 (April 2010) at 2, online: Leuven
Centre for Global Governance Studies <http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be>; see also Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of
Foreign Investment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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In July 2010, the World Bank introduced a new policy on access to information.
See World Bank, Access to Information, online: World Bank
<http://www.worldbank.org>.
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In response to international concerns that confidential contracts breed corruption
and that greater transparency is needed, several sources of pressure urging the disclosure of contracts are mounting. The BTC contracts discussed above (supra notes
35, 71) were disclosed after civil society uproar led the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to put pressure on BP to disclose the agreements; see Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors
at the Expense of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at
115. In the wake of the recommendation by the Extractive Industries Review (supra
note 59) that the World Bank Group require the disclosure of contracts in the extractive sector, the IFC altered its Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability to require that: (i) for significant new extractive industries projects, clients publicly disclose their material project payments to the host government (such as royal-
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Environmental regulation of large projects through contracts does
not only happen through investment agreements. Large mining and oil
and gas projects, for example, are routinely subject to a range of environmental protection demands from state and non-state communities of
interest, and must answer these demands to secure a ―social license to
operate‖, particularly in ecologically sensitive sites. Contracts with
governments, local communities, and conservation organizations have
emerged as one mechanism for responding to community demands for
environmental safeguards. Negotiated agreements with companies may
take the form of environmental agreements,77 impact and benefit
agreements,78 or good neighbour agreements. They may also emerge as
part of community-company negotiations on natural resource projects.79
These negotiated agreements may respond to gaps in regulatory regimes and add an additional layer of project-specific environmental
regulation.

ties, taxes and profit sharing), and the relevant terms of key agreements that are of
public concern such as host government agreements (HGAs) and intergovernmental
agreements (IGAs); see IFC, Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (30
April 2006), online: IFC <http://www.ifc.org>.
77

See Affolder, supra note 34, for a discussion of the environmental agreement that
governs the Ekati Diamond Mine in Canada‘s Northwest Territories; see also Ciaran
O‘Faircheallaigh, Environmental Agreements in Canada: Aboriginal Participation,
EIA Follow-up and Environmental Management of Major Projects (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2006); Meinhard Doelle, ―Regulating the Environment by Mediation andContract Negotiation: A Case Study of the Dona Lake
Agreement‖ (1992) 2:2 J Envtl L & Prac 129.
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A data set of these agreements is now housed at University of Melbourne as part of
the Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements (ATNS) Project, online: ATNS
<http://www.atns.net.au>.
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See Christian Rarivoson, ―The Mandena Dina, a Potential Tool at the Local Level
for Sustainable Management of Renewable Natural Resources‖ in Jörg U Ganzhorn, Steven M Goodman & Manon Vincelette, eds, Biodiversity, Ecology and
Conservation of Littoral Ecosystems in Southeastern Madagascar, Tolagnaro (Fort
Dauphin) (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2007) 309; for example, in the
QIT Madagascar Minerals ilmenite mine, a dina (a Malagasy social contract) was
negotiated between the communities and the mining company pursuant to which
the company, the communities, and the Malagasy forest department co-manage
conservation zones. The dina also incorporates the company‘s environmental and
social programmes as set out in the Integrated Development Plan.
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Contractual approaches to regulation illustrate the dynamic nature of
regulation. The impact and benefit agreements, environmental agreements, and community agreements referenced above are of fairly recent
vintage. But contracts as an aspect of large project regulation were also
the subject of interest in earlier decades. The late 1970s and early 1980s
featured a period of intense interest in large project law and governance
in a number of jurisdictions, with particular interest in contractual approaches. State or franchise agreements, which gave statutory effect to
large project agreements, were the subject of much Australian scholarship.80 In Canada, interest in environmental regulation generally, and
contractual approaches to environment regulation more particularly,
emerged, particularly in the context of debates surrounding natural resource development in Canada‘s North.81
A further category of contracts that is deserving of greater regulatory
scrutiny is standard form contracts.82 Energy and resource industry associations, particularly petroleum associations, are active in producing
standardized contracts.83 Model or standard contracts can have enor80

See e.g. Leigh Warnick, ―State Agreements‖ (1988) 62:11 Austl LJ 878; Malcolm
Hollick, ―Industry Agreement Acts and Environmental Management in Australia‖
(1983) 7:3 Environmental Management 253; KD MacDonald, ―The Negotiation
and Enforcement of Agreements with State Government Relating to the Development of Mineral Ventures‖ (1977) 1:1 Australia Mining Petroleum Law Journal 29;
and for more recent work, see Michael Crommelin, ―State Agreements: Australian
Trends and Experience‖ (1996) AMPLA Yearbook 328; Richard Hillman, ―The Future Role for State Agreements in Western Australia‖ (2006) 25:3 (2006) Australian
Resources and Energy Law Journal 293.
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Andrew R Thompson, ―Contractual v. Regulatory Modes for Major Resource Development Projects‖ (1984) 8 Resources, online: Canadian Institute of Resources
Law <http://www.cirl.ca>; Andrew R Thompson, Environmental Regulation in
Canada: An Assessment of the Regulatory Process (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1980); J Owen Saunders, ―New Directions in Resource Management: The Single Window‖ (1983) 5:1 Resources, online: Canadian Institute of Resources Law <http://www
.cirl.ca>; Barry Barton, Robert Franson & Andrew Thompson, A Contract Model
for Pollution Control (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1984).
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See e.g. Oren Perez, ―Using Private-Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental
Conflicts: The Case of International Construction Contracts‖ (2002) 29:1 JL &
Soc‘y 77 (arguing that standard form construction contracts can institutionalize ecological indifference).
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A Timothy Martin, ―Model Contracts: A Survey of the Global Petroleum Industry‖
(2004) 22:3 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 281.
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mous influence across individual projects. They evidence the need to
look for environmental regulation in unanticipated places.
A wide range of contracts thus take on environmental regulatory
functions in project settings. Contracts can be extremely responsive to
project-specific contexts and unforeseen issues. But as the concern
around the use of stabilization clauses highlights, contracts can also
lead to a gutting or undermining of otherwise applicable environmental
regulation. A further concern that contracts raise is the ability to dislodge contractual forms of environmental regulation by exiting the contract. Chad demonstrated this in the context of the Chad–Cameroon
pipeline project where it evaded World Bank conditions in a loan
agreement by prepaying the loan. India avoided World Bank conditions
by withdrawing its loan application in the Narmada dam project.84 Governance through contracts allows parties to contract out of domestic law
and apply ambiguous international standards as the only governing
law.85 This concern can be better understood through a richer understanding of the multiple interacting arms of project-specific regulation,
and the multiple levels of contractual regulation.
Contracts fit within a wider context of public law and institutions for
judicial enforcement. As Hugh Collins has so convincingly shown in
the domestic law context, contracts regulate but they are also regulated.86 Further research on the contractual governance of large projects
could build upon Collins‘s study by examining how contracts are regulated as a matter of transnational law. How important are contractual
provisions in the large project context, where contracts are difficult to
enforce? Further research could also check against the risk that legal
scholars overstate the importance of contracts as an aspect of environmental regulation.

84

See Khagram, supra note 51 at 130.
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Kyla Tienhaara, ―Environmental Aspects of Host Government Contracts in the
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86
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B. PROJECT OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING

In most jurisdictions where some form of environmental assessment is
practiced, follow-up has been dubbed the weakest stage.87 Indeed, a
common critique of large projects, whether they are situated in Mozambique or Melbourne, is that oversight and monitoring regimes are absent or insufficient. While the terminology is often used loosely, monitoring frequently refers to some form of testing to measure the environmental impacts of a project. Oversight generally refers to a ―watchdog‖ function of ensuring that the project proponent is complying with
their environmental commitments. But oversight need not only refer to
watching the performance of a project proponent. It also includes in its
scope the oversight of regulators to see if they are performing their
statutory duties. Environmental oversight bodies may emerge in project
settings as a requirement of legislation, as part of a contractual agreement to create such an institution, or in practice without an explicit legislative, regulatory, or contractual basis.
Given the multiple hats that host governments wear as investment
attractors, tax and royalty collectors, and environmental regulators,
their capacity and willingness to strictly monitor environmental regimes
poses a problem in many project situations. Oversight bodies are one
response to the lack of capacity and will to rigorously monitor project
impacts. These bodies can have vastly different forms, functions, powers, and degrees of integration into other legal and regulatory processes.
Yet remarkably little is known about the types of oversight bodies that
exist in large projects and their efficacy.
Monitoring institutions provide a useful point for thinking about the
application of responsive regulatory approaches, as they can yield the
information that is vital to escalating or de-escalating sanctions and
supports. Responsiveness depends on fine-tuned and highly contextualized responses to the activities of those being regulated. Accessing accurate accounts of these activities can be a challenge in large project
contexts, and monitoring institutions can play vital roles in respect to
accessing information.
Various forms of commission of inquiry have long accompanied
large projects. In the UK, the so-called ―big public inquiry‖ has been a
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O‘Faircheallaigh, supra note 77 at 1.
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mechanism for debating large go/no-go decisions for projects.88 In Canada, Thomas Berger‘s Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry stands as a
high water mark of public inquiry.89 A number of jurisdictions have also
used committees of inquiry to examine the implications of uranium
mining.90
At the level of the individual project, monitoring agencies have
emerged to provide a watchdog on environmental performance once the
decision to approve a project is made. In Canada, diamond projects in
the Mackenzie Valley have yielded various instructive experiments in
structuring environmental oversight agencies.91 The emergence of these
independent oversight agencies speaks to a monitoring gap in existing
regulation; it also reflects a lack of trust on the part of the local, predominantly First Nations communities, that either government or the
project proponent would live up to the commitments made as part of the
environmental assessment process unless they were being ―watched‖.92
These oversight institutions are tasked with both promoting Aboriginal
participation and ensuring that government regulators and project pro88

See Council for Science and Society, The Big Public Inquiry: A Proposed New
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ponents keep to promises made with respect to environmental aspects
of project governance. The Ekati Diamond Mine, Diavik Diamond
Mine, and Snap Lake Diamond Mine have each adopted a distinct form
of environmental oversight agency.93 These institutions provide independent oversight of not only the project proponent (the traditional
regulated entity) but also of the regulator (the government agencies
tasked with regulating the project proponent). These monitoring agencies also reflect how a flexible and responsive regulatory innovation
introduced in one project (the independent environmental monitoring
agency for the Ekati Mine) can create expectations that crystallize into a
practice where such one-off innovations become expected by projectaffected communities, and even institutionalized in regulatory practice.
Outside of Canada, other forms of project-specific environmental
oversight have emerged as a result of agreements between mining companies and affected communities. For example, the Good Neighbor
Agreement (GNA) signed between community groups and the Stillwater Mine in Montana, establishes an oversight body at each of the
mine‘s two project sites.94 A technology oversight committee was also
established to ensure that responsible practices, including continuous
technological improvements, are incorporated into the mine site operations.95 The mandate of these oversight committees includes monitoring
the implementation of the GNA agreement, resolving disputes, and
maintaining lines of communication between the parties.96 In order to
function as both a technical watchdog and a conduit of information the
oversight committees are vested with certain rights under the GNA in93
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cluding broad access to information from the proponent, as well as citizen-sampling, mine access, and mine inspection rights.97 These bodies
emerged as part of a contractual negotiation between concerned community groups and the company, a negotiation process that developed
completely outside of governmental regulatory approval processes for
the mine expansion.
These project-specific examples of project ―watchdogs‖ speak to the
concern that follow-up and monitoring are among the most problematic
stages of environmental regulation. Project oversight has also emerged
as a significant issue for international financial institutions. The World
Bank Inspection Panel, established in 1993, was largely motivated by
concerns about the impacts on local communities and the environment
of several large Bank-funded projects. These included the Narmada projects in India, which attracted significant criticism from the NGO community of the environmental assessment process and the way in which
resettlement issues were addressed.98 The Inspection Panel hears requests for inspection from organizations or other groupings of two or
more individuals that believe they are likely to be adversely affected
from the Bank‘s violation of its own policies and procedures. The Inspection Panel has also spawned oversight agencies at other international institutions. These include the Independent Evaluation Group for
the World Bank Group institutions, the Accountability Mechanism at
the Asian Development Bank, and the Independent Review Mechanism
at the African Development Bank Group. Examples of oversight at international financial institutions highlight the transnational dimensions
of regulatory approaches. While projects intensely affect local environments, many key regulators are transnational institutions.
C. ―INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS‖ AS A REGULATORY TOOL

International standards offer a particularly useful lens for thinking about
responsive approaches to project regulation as they provide a dynamic
means of ratcheting up standards, rather than fixing regulation on rules
97
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―that ossify industry standards at the state of the art at the times rules
were written.‖99 A regulatory approach that relies on flexible standards
may offer a welcome departure from regulatory approaches fixated on
narrow interpretations of rule compliance where cosmetic compliance is
always a risk. But ―international standards‖ present their own challenges as a regulatory device.
References to ―international standards‖ in project documents emerge
in different ways and with different legal consequences. Standards can
be technical performance standards or broad statements of principle.
They can be best-practice guides rather than mandatory enforceable
rules. Some references to standards are industry-specific and thus denote ―international standards‖ applicable in a particular industry. An
example of this is ―good oilfield practices‖, which were introduced as a
source of regulation in a production sharing agreement between the
Government of Georgia and Canargo Norio Ltd.100 Corporations or
banks may also impose their own standards applicable to all global operations, such as Goldman Sachs‘s Environmental Policy and its endorsement of the Benchmark of Biodiversity Management Practices.101
In large project settings, ―international standards‖ are often intended to
refer to the International Finance Corporation‘s Performance Standards,
which have become a commonly used yardstick for social and environmental ―safeguards‖ in large projects.102
Views on the regulatory significance of ―international standards‖
differ sharply. Thomas Wälde, who spent many years advising corpora99
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tions and governments on transnational contracts, suggests that the task
of managing compliance with international standards has become a major challenge for both management and legal professionals in the natural resource and energy sectors.103 He suggests that global standards
work as a regulatory device both directly and indirectly. Their direct
function is to operate by incorporation into treaties, conflicts and regulation. But they also operate indirectly by ―giving more specificity and
substance to open-ended standards in the primary legal instruments,
they legitimize legal argument and arbitral decision-making and they
provide some protection [for corporations] from NGO campaigns operating through public opinion.‖104 Picking up on this last point, Judith
Kimerling, who has campaigned against Occidental Petroleum‘s operations in Ecuador‘s Amazon Oil Fields, is particularly concerned that the
lack of specificity and transparency around corporate references to ―international standards‖ invites corporate manipulation of these standards.
She suggests that ―Occidental has used ‗international standards‘ to wrap
its activities in a veneer of environmental excellence; reassure government officials and local residents; cultivate confusion about standards
and practices that apply to the operations; deflect meaningful oversight
and transparency; and arbitrarily legitimize norms that have been defined by special interests.‖105
There is room for research into the ways in which international standards are integrated into corporate management and impact the behaviour of companies from within. Given the often glacial nature of international environmental treaty negotiation, international standards are an
important site for articulating international norms. This means that
companies will be attentive to the ratcheting up of environmental standards through developments in ―international standards‖.106
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While international standards, oversight agencies, and projectspecific contracts all force us to think about the opportunities for a more
careful consideration of decentred approaches to large project regulation, the capacity of regulators to coordinate such approaches cannot be
assumed. The model of a local government ―harnessing‖ other public
and private organizations to promote its goals may be misplaced. Further, the multiplicity of actors and issues involved means that it may not
be possible to ―design‖ a regulatory system where the interactions between regulators are coordinated or ―networked‖ in any prescriptive
way.
V. CONCLUSION: MUSINGS ON METHODS
This article has argued that the environmental aspects of large project
regulation are worthy, and indeed deserving, of greater study. I have
drawn together examples of a disparate literature that illustrate that
there are case-based studies from which ambitious and theoreticallyinformed meta-analysis can develop. One of the challenges for future
researchers is not only to produce more individual case studies, but to
think about appropriate methodologies for building upon new and existing case studies. I have suggested three avenues for descriptively thick
new research on environmental regulation in large project settings
(regulation through contracts, monitoring agencies, and international
standards) that can complement existing case studies. And I have provided an example of the best of this sort of scholarship—the
―Braithwaitean‖ tradition which combines careful empirical investigation, ambitious meta-analysis, and dynamic theorizing.
What is left to acknowledge, then, are the immense methodological
challenges of creating such expansive, yet carefully informed, work. I
have already alluded to the very challenge of defining ―environmental
which allows the project sponsor (the Lessee) to contract out of any improvements
in ―international standards‖:
―Nothing in this mining lease or in the Decree or other legislation shall impose any liability
whatsoever on the Lessee in respect of any pollution or loss or damage to the environment or
the risk thereof, or other claim, where such pollution, loss, damage, risk or claim arises from,
or in connection with, any acts or omissions in or with respect to the Mining Lease Areas prior
to the date of this Mining Lease, or from the raising or extension of environmental standards
generally accepted in the international mining industry above the level of such standards as
prevailing as at the date hereof, or as a result of scientific or technological information, analysis or findings not available at the date hereof . . .‖.

554

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL. 44:3

regulation‖. I admit that it is not only decentred approaches to regulation that require further elucidation. In many cases, knowledge of conventional and market-based approaches to regulation in many project
settings is lacking. Environmental regulation can involve complex and
uncertain technical and scientific issues. It takes place against a backdrop of regulatory initiatives that are often constantly moving targets.
International treaties, European Community legislation, and domestic
law from multiple jurisdictions combine to produce a mind-numbing
package of applicable law, all of which can be complex and fastdeveloping.
A first step in promoting meta-analysis of environmental regulation
of large projects is promoting a conversation about large projects
among regulatory scholars. This is a conversation that extends regulatory debates in new directions and invites scholars to tackle issues of
environmental regulation that are highly contested and relevant beyond
the developed countries where responsive regulation debates have
mostly flared. But it is not a conversation that can be limited to scholars. It implicates all those who regulate, and are regulated, in large project contexts. It is also a conversation that can change the way that we
teach environmental law and regulation. Large project regulation belongs in our textbooks of national and international environmental law.
The cross-cutting work this article hopes to promote is not intended
to yield a recipe for regulation that can be applied across the globe. It
does not envisage environmental law as a cut-and-paste tool. Rather,
this article has higher aspirations: to encourage the carefully nuanced,
thought-provoking, and intellectually rigorous sort of scholarship that
John Braithwaite has taught us is possible.

